SMOKE-FREE DINING
DOES NOT HARM BAR OR
RESTAURANT BUSINESS
OR TOURISM.
The Health &
Economic Impact of
New York's Clean
Indoor Air Act
July 2006, New York
State Dept of Health
(pdf format; 24
pages).
The Economic Impact
of Secondhand Smoke
in Maryland
Feb 14, 2006, Report
by the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of
Public Health, (pdf
format; 24 pgs).
Ventilation page of
www.no-smoke.org
(Americans for
Non-Smoker's
Rights), i.e.
ventilation is not
the answer.
Economics section
from
WWW.TOBACCOSCAM.UCSF.EDU
Despite the tobacco
industry's claims
that these measures
hurt business, the
facts show that, on
average, there is no
adverse economic
impact on either
bars or restaurants.
85% of Marylanders
are non-smokers.
Demand for
smoke-free bars and
restaurants is
increasing.
*****************************************
Sales Don’t Lie.
“After the
California ban and
New York City
[smoke-free]
regulations were
implemented in the
mid 1990s, new
restaurants
continued to pour
into those markets
in historically
unparalleled
numbers.” (Nation's
Restaurant News
November 2002)
According to a
monograph from the
University of
California San
Francisco (www.tobaccoscam.ucsf.edu),
“Going smoke-free is
risk-free from a
business
standpoint…“All
reputable economic
studies show
smoke-free measures
do not reduce and
may increase
restaurant sales. .
. No reliable
economic study has
ever found that
going smoke-free
reduced restaurant
sales, even when
surrounding areas
still allowed
smoking.”
Smoke-Free Dining
Reduces Liabilities:
As evidence mounts
about the dangers of
tobacco smoke
pollution, so do
employers’
liabilities. A 1993
National Restaurant
Association
memorandum indicated
that employers could
be held liable for
legal claims made by
employees who
develop lung cancer
or other ailments.
Every single
credible health
organization has
concluded that
tobacco smoke
pollution is a
carcinogen. The fact
that second hand
tobacco smoke causes
significant numbers
of death from heart
disease among
non-smokers is also
firmly established.
Restaurants and bars
that allow smoking
have higher
maintenance expenses
(carpets, drapes,
linens, paint),
higher insurance
premiums (fire,
medical, workers
comp, liability) and
higher labor costs
(absenteeism,
productivity).
History Repeats
Itself:
Predictably, after
each new local or
state-wide
smoke-free
ordinance, news
reports appear about
how these policies
are harming
business. Tobacco
companies work
behind the scenes to
encourage these news
stories, often
working through
restaurant
associations. The
reports are
typically based on
unscientific surveys
and informal first
impressions. In
every single case,
when there is time
to collect objective
data such as sales
tax data, 6-12
months before and
after a new
smoke-free
ordinance, it is
shown that, on
average, there is
absolutely no
decline in sales
after 100%
smoke-free
ordinances for
either bars or
restaurants. Period.
In every case. 6-12
months of data is
needed to control
for seasonal and
other variations in
sales. Those who
don't look at the
objective evidence
can be misled by
each new set of
predictions of
economic calamity
with each new
smoke-free
ordinance.
*****************************************
Other evidence of
the lack of adverse
economic impact of
smoke-free bars and
restaurants:
Scollo M, Lal A,
Hyland A, and Glantz
S: Review of the
quality of studies
on the economic
effects of
smoke-free policies
on the hospitality
industry Tobacco
Control 2003;
12:13-2
http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/12/1/13.pdf
Smoke-free workplace
policies reduce both
exposure to
secondhand tobacco
smoke and cigarette
consumption.1–3
Smoke-free
restaurants and bars
similarly reduce
exposure to tobacco
smoke toxins among
hospitality workers
and patrons but also
represent a serious
business threat to
the tobacco
industry.
In California in
1987, a 100%
smoke-free
restaurant ordinance
in Beverly Hills was
rolled back, partly
in response to
claims that the
ordinance was
responsible for
reducing restaurant
revenues by 30%,
claims which later
turned out to be
unsubstantiated.4
Since then, tobacco
companies and allied
groups have
routinely predicted
that enactment of
such legislation
would severely
impact restaurant
and bar sales and
employment.5–9
Health advocates, by
contrast, have
presented studies
indicating that no
such adverse effects
actually occurred.10
Policymakers are
typically presented
with a large amount
of conflicting
material, with
evidence ranging
from anecdotes about
individual
businesses11 to
scientific studies
analysing objective
information
collected
independently across
an entire
hospitality
sector.12 Such data
are often confusing
to interpret and it
is difficult for
policymakers to
reach an evidence
based conclusion. In
their case study of
deliberations by the
Maryland
Occupational Safety
and Health Advisory
Board, Montini et al
demonstrate that
those opposing
proposed smoke-free
workplace
regulations lodged
twice the number of
submissions as those
supporting it, but
that evidence from
opponents was
substantially less
scientifically
rigorous than
evidence provided by
supporters of
workplace smoking
regulations.13
Similar findings
were observed in
relation to the
Californian
Environmental
Protection Agency’s
risk assessment of
secondhand smoke,14
and in Maryland and
Washington hearings
on proposed clean
indoor air
regulations.15 Bero
and her colleagues
have repeatedly
called on advocates
to more forcefully
draw to legislators’
attention the
superior scientific
quality of the
evidence base relied
upon by public
health groups in
calling for clean
air
legislation.13–15
This paper compares
the quality of
evidence and
conclusions about
the economic impact
of smoke-free laws
on the hospitality
industry based on
the type of data
used, how the
studies are
designed, analysed
and interpreted, and
the funding source.
ABSTRACT Objective:
To compare the
quality and funding
source of studies
concluding a
negative economic
impact of smoke-free
policies in the
hospitality industry
to studies
concluding no such
negative impact.
Data sources:
Researchers sought
all studies produced
before 31 August
2002. Articles
published in
scientific journals
were located with
Medline, Science
Citation Index,
Social Sciences
Citation Index,
Current Contents,
PsychInfo, Econlit,
and Healthstar.
Unpublished studies
were located from
tobacco company
websites and through
internet searches.
Study selection: 97
studies that made
statements about
economic impact were
included. 93% of the
studies located met
the selection
criteria as
determined by
consensus between
multiple reviewers.
Data extraction:
Findings and
characteristics of
studies (apart from
funding source) were
classified
independently by two
researchers. A third
assessor blind to
both the objective
of the present study
and to funding
source also
classified each
study.
Data synthesis: In
studies concluding a
negative impact, the
odds of using a
subjective outcome
measure was 4.0
times (95%
confidence interval
(CI) 1.4 to 9.6; p =
0.007) and the odds
of not being peer
reviewed was 20
times (95% CI 2.6 to
166.7; p = 0.004)
that of studies
concluding no such
negative impact. All
of the studies
concluding a
negative impact were
supported by the
tobacco industry.
94% of the tobacco
industry supported
studies concluded a
negative economic
impact compared to
none of the
non-industry
supported studies.
Conclusion: All of
the best designed
studies report no
impact or a positive
impact of smoke-free
restaurant and bar
laws on sales or
employment.
Policymakers can act
to protect workers
and patrons from the
toxins in secondhand
smoke confident in
rejecting industry
claims that there
will be an adverse
economic impact.
Caroline M.
Fichtenberg and
Stanton A Glantz:
Effect of Smokefree
Workplaces on
Smoking Behavior:
Systematic Review:
British Medical
Journal, Jul 2002;
325: 188. This
review of 26 studies
showed that totally
smokefree workplaces
led to a decline in
the absolute smoking
prevalence of 3.8%
and also a decline
in daily cigarette
consumption of 3.1
fewer cigarettes
smoked per
continuing smoker
among employees,
yielding a mean
reduction of 1.3
cigarettes per day
per employee, which
corresponds to a
relative reduction
of 29% in the
cigarette
consumption rate.
Smokefree workplaces
not only protect
nonsmokers from the
dangers of passive
smoking, they also
encourage smokers to
quit or to reduce
consumption.
R Edwards and D
Reed: Are smoke-free
policies good for
business? (Survey of
pubs / restaurants
indicating smokefree
policies are
popular). December
1, 2002; 11(4): 380
- 380. HTML or PDF:
http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/11/4/380.pdf
Bartosch W, Pope G.
The effect of
smoking restrictions
on restaurant
business in
Massachusetts,
1992-1998. Tobacco
Control
2002;11(Suppl
II):ii38-42. Bialous
S, Glantz S Tobacco
Control in Arizona
Institute for Health
Policy Studies,
University of
California. 1997
www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/az.
Glantz S Effect of
smokefree bar law on
bar revenues in
California Tobacco
Control
2000;9(1):111-2
Hyland A, Tuk J.
Restaurant
employment boom in
New York City.
Tobacco Control
2001;10:199-200.
Jones K, Wakefield
M, Turnball D.
Attitudes and
experiences of
restaurateurs
regarding smoking
bans in Adelaide,
South Australia.
Tobacco Control
1999;8; Spring
1999:62-6.
Lessons learned from
the tobacco
industries’ efforts
to prevent the
passage of a work
place smoking
regulation. Am J
Public Health
2000;90:1926–30.
OBJECTIVES: This
study assessed the
implementation of
tobacco industry
strategies to
prevent a workplace
smoking regulation.
METHODS: Tobacco
industry internal
documents were
identified; hearing
transcripts for the
affiliations,
arguments, and
positions regarding
the regulation of
testifiers were
coded; and media
coverage was
analyzed. RESULTS:
Tobacco industry
strategies sought to
increase business
participation and
economic discussions
at public hearings
and to promote
unfavorable media
coverage of the
regulation. The
percentage of
business
representatives
opposing the
regulation grew from
18% (5 to 28) to 57%
(13 of 23) between
the hearings.
Economic arguments
opposing the
regulation rose from
25% (7 of 28) to 70%
(16 of 23). Press
coverage was neutral
and did not increase
during the period of
the regulatory
hearings.
CONCLUSIONS: The
tobacco industry was
successful in
implementing 2 of
its 3 strategies but
was not able to
prevent passage of
the comprehensive
workplace
regulation.
*********************************************
Bartosch W, Pope G.
The economic effect
of smokefree
restaurant policies
on restaurant
businesses in
Massachusetts J
Public Health Manag
Pract
1999;5(1):53-62
(cited in Scollo et
al, Tobacco Control,
2003 as “ref 7”)
Bartosch W, Pope G.
Preliminary analysis
of the economic
impact of Brooklines
smoking ban.
Massachusetts:
Health Economics
Research Inc; 1995.
Bartosch W, Pope G.
The economic effect
of smoke-free
restaurant policies
on restaurant
businesses in
Massachusetts.
Journal of Public
Health Management
Practices
1999;5:53-62.
Biener L, Siegel M.
Behavior intentions
of the public after
bans on smoking in
restaurants and
bars. AJPH 1997; 87:
2042-2044.
Biener L; Fitzgerald
G. Smoky bars and
restaurants: who
avoids them and why?
Journal of Public
Health Management
and Practice, 1999
Jan, 5(1):74-8.
Corsun DL, Young CA,
Enz CA. Should NYC's
restaurateurs
lighten up? Effects
of the city's
smoke-free air act.
Cornell Hotel and
Rest Admin Q 1996;
37: 25-33.
Dyer C. Confidential
tobacco documents
enter public domain.
British Medical
Journal
1998;316:1186.
(cited in Scollo et
al, Tobacco Control,
2003 as “ref 3”)
Ellis GA, Hobart RL,
Reed DF. Overcoming
a powerful tobacco
lobby in enacting
local smoking
ordinances: The
Contra Costa County
experience. J Pub
Health Policy 1996;
17: 28-46.
Evans MK. Review of
Cornell survey on
smoking bans in New
York City: executive
summary. Cornell
Hotel and Rest Admin
Q 1996; 37: 8-9.
Glantz S,
Charlesworth A
Tourism and hotel
revenues before and
after passage of
smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances JAMA
1999;281:1911-1918
Glantz S, Smith L
The effect of
ordinances requiring
smokefree
restaurants and bars
on revenues: A
follow up Am J
Public Health
1997;87(10):1687-1693
Glantz SA, Smith LRA.
The effect of
ordinances requiring
smoke-free
restaurants on
restaurant sales.
AJPH 1994; 84:
1081-1085. Erratum
AJPH 1997; 87:
1729-1730.
Glantz SA Tourism
and Hotel Revenues
Before and After
Passage of
Smoke-Free
Restaurant
Ordinances JAMA, May
26, 1999—Vol 281,
No. 20 pg 1911
Glantz SA.
Smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances do not
affect restaurant
business.
Period [editorial].
Journal of Public
Health Management
and Practice, 1999
Jan, 5(1):vi-ix.
Goldstein A, Sobel R
Environmental
tobacco smoke
regulations have not
hurt restaurant
sales in North
Carolina North
Carolina Med J
1998;59(5):284-287
Huang P, Tobias S,
Kohout S, Harris M,
Satterwhite D,
Simpson D, et al.
Assessment of the
impact of a 100%
smokefree ordinances
on restaurant sales
West Lake Hills,
Texas, 1992-1994
MMWR
1995;44(19):370-372
Hopkins, DP, Briss
PA, Ricard CJ, et.
al Reviews of
Evidence Regarding
Interventions to
Reduce Tobacco Use
and Exposure to
Environmental
Tobacco Smoke. Am J
Prev Med 2001;20(2S)
Hyland A, Cummings
KM. Restaurant
reports of the
economic impact of
the New York City
smoke-free air act.
J Pub Health Mgmt
Prac 1999; 5:37-41.
Hyland A, Cummings
KM. Restaurant
employment before
and after the New
York City smoke-free
air act. J Pub
Health Mgmt Prac
1999; 5:22-27.
Hyland A, Vena C,
Cummings K, Lubin A
The Effect of the
Clean Air Act of
Erie County, New
York on Restaurant
Employment J Public
Health Manag Pract
2000;6(6):76-85
Hyland A, Cummings
K, Nauenberg E
Analysis of taxable
sales receipts: was
New York City's
Smoke-free Air Act
bad for business? J
Public Health Manag
Pract
1999;5(1):14-21
Hyland A. Before and
After Smoke-free
Regulations in New
Taxable Sales from
Eating and Drinking
Places in New York
State. New York:
Roswell Park Cancer
Institute; 2002
June.
Rigotti NA, Stoto
MA, Schelling TC. Do
businesses comply
with a no-smoking
law? Assessing the
self-enforcement
approach. Prev Med
1994; 23: 223-229.
Samuels B, Glantz S.
The politics of
local tobacco
control. JAMA
1991;266:2110–7.
Sciacca J, Ratliff M
Prohibiting smoking
in restaurants:
Effects on
restaurant sales
Am J Health Promot
1998;12(3):176-184
Sciacca JP. A
mandatory smoking
ban in restaurants:
concerns versus
experiences. J Comm
Health 1996; 21:
133-150.
Sciacca JP, Eckrem
M. Effects of a city
ordinance regulating
smoking in
restaurants and
retail stores. J
Comm Health 1993;
18:175-182.
From the Centers for
Disease Control and
Prevention.
Assessment of the
impact of a 100%
smoke-free ordinance
on restaurant
sales--West Lake
Hills, Texas,
1992-1994. JAMA 1995
Jul 19,
274(3):206-8.
Office of Smoking
and Health. 'Impact
of a Smoking Ban on
Restaurant and Bar
Revenues — El Paso,
Texas, 2002'
Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly
Report, February 27,
2004. Comment: The
analysis found that
no statistically
significant changes
in restaurant and
bar revenues
occurred after the
smoking ban took
effect. These
findings are
consistent with and
add to the existing
body of evidence
that local and state
laws making enclosed
workplaces and
public places
smokefree do not
negatively impact
restaurant and bar
sales or other
related economic
indicators.
*********************************************
Biener L, Siegel M.,
Am J Public Health
1997
Dec;87(12):2042-4
Behavior intentions
of the public after
bans on smoking in
restaurants and
bars.
Center for Survey
Research, University
of Massachusetts,
Boston 02125, USA.
OBJECTIVES: This
study assessed the
potential effect of
smoke-free policies
on bar and
restaurant
patronage. METHODS:
Random-digit dialing
techniques were used
in surveying a
representative
sample of
Massachusetts adults
(n = 2356) by
telephone. RESULTS:
Approximately 61% of
the respondents
predicted no change
in their use of
restaurants in
response to
smoke-free policies,
30% predicted
increased use, and
8% predicted
decreased use. In
turn, 69% of the
respondents
predicted no change
in their patronage
of bars, while 20%
predicted increased
use and 11%
predicted decreased
use. CONCLUSIONS:
These results
suggest that
smoke-free policies
are likely to
increase overall
patronage of bars
and restaurants.
Glantz SA; Smith LR.
The effect of
ordinances requiring
smoke-free
restaurants and bars
on revenues: a
follow-up [see
comments] [published
erratum appears in
Am J Public Health
1998
Jul;88(7):1122].
American Journal of
Public Health, 1997
Oct, 87(10):1687-93.
Abstract:
OBJECTIVES: The
purpose of this
study was to extend
an earlier
evaluation of the
economic effects of
ordinances requiring
smoke-free
restaurants and
bars. METHODS: Sales
tax data for 15
cities with
smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances, 5 cities
and 2 counties with
smoke-free bar
ordinances, and
matched comparison
locations were
analyzed by multiple
regression,
including time and a
dummy variable for
the ordinance.
RESULTS: Ordinances
had no significant
effect on the
fraction of total
retail sales that
went to eating and
drinking places or
on the ratio between
sales in communities
with ordinances and
sales in comparison
communities.
Ordinances requiring
smoke-free bars had
no significant
effect on the
fraction of revenues
going to eating and
drinking places that
serve all types of
liquor. CONCLUSIONS:
Smoke-free
ordinances do not
adversely affect
either restaurant or
bar sales.
Hyland A; Cummings
KM. Restaurateur
reports of the
economic impact of
the New York City
Smoke-Free Air Act.
Journal of Public
Health Management
and Practice, 1999
Jan, 5(1):37-42.
Abstract: The
objective of this
study was to
determine the extent
to which
restaurateurs have
reported a change in
business since the
New York City
Smoke-Free Air Act
took effect. A
population-based
cross-sectional
telephone survey of
434 owners/managers
of restaurants
located in New York
City was conducted
by an independent
survey firm during
November and
December 1996. There
is no evidence to
suggest that the
smoke-free law has
had a detrimental
effect on the city's
restaurant business.
Bartosch WJ; Pope
GC. The economic
effect of smoke-free
restaurant policies
on restaurant
business in
Massachusetts.
Journal of Public
Health Management
and Practice, 1999
Jan, 5(1):53-62.
Abstract: The
objective of the
study was to
determine if local
smoke-free
restaurant policies
in Massachusetts
affected restaurant
sales. The authors
used a
pre-/post-quasi-experimental
design to compare
town-level meals tax
data before and
after the imposition
of local smoke-free
restaurant policies.
Data for 235 towns
(including 32
adopting
communities) were
entered into a fixed
effects regression
model to estimate
changes in
restaurant sales
over time. The study
failed to find a
statistically
significant effect
of local smoke-free
policies on
restaurant business.
It provides evidence
that local
smoke-free policies
do not cause a large
decline in
communities'
restaurant
industries.
Biener L; Fitzgerald
G. Smoky bars and
restaurants: who
avoids them and why?
Journal of Public
Health Management
and Practice, 1999
Jan, 5(1):74-8.
Abstract: The
objective of this
study was to provide
new insight into who
avoids smoky places,
the types of places
they avoid, and the
reasons they give. A
representative
sample of
Massachusetts adults
(N = 4,929) was
surveyed by
telephone during
1995 and 1996.
Forty-six percent of
non-smokers reported
having avoided a
smoky place. Reasons
were aversion to
the lingering smell
(34.8%) and health
issues (31.9%). Many
adults avoid
restaurants and bars
because of the
expectation of
excessive
environmental
tobacco smoke (ETS).
Patronage may
increase after
smoke-free policies
are implemented and
nonsmokers become
aware of the
opportunity to dine
in establishments
free of ETS.
Glantz SA;
Charlesworth A.
Tourism and hotel
revenues before and
after passage of
smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances. JAMA1999
May 26,
281(20):1911-8.
CONTEXT: Claims that
ordinances requiring
smoke-free
restaurants will
adversely affect
tourism have been
used to argue
against passing such
ordinances. Data
exist regarding the
validity of these
claims.
OBJECTIVE: To
determine the
changes in hotel
revenues and
international
tourism after
passage of
smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances in
locales where the
effect has been
debated. DESIGN:
Comparison of hotel
revenues and tourism
rates before
and after passage of
100% smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances and
comparison with US
hotel revenue
overall.
SETTING: Three
states (California,
Utah, and Vermont)
and 6 cities
(Boulder, Colo;
Flagstaff, Ariz; Los
Angeles, Calif;
Mesa, Ariz; New
York, NY; and San
Francisco, Calif) in
which the effect on
tourism of
smoke-free
restaurant
ordinances had been
debated. MAIN
OUTCOME MEASURES:
Hotel room revenues
and hotel revenues
as a fraction of
total
retail sales
compared with
preordinance
revenues and overall
US revenues.
RESULTS: In constant
1997 dollars,
passage of the
smoke-free
restaurant ordinance
was associated with
a statistically
significant increase
in the rate of
change of hotel
revenues in 4
localities, no
significant change
in 4 localities, and
a significant
slowing in the rate
of increase (but not
a decrease) in 1
locality. There was
no significant
change in the rate
of change of hotel
revenues as a
fraction of total
retail sales (P=.16)
or total US hotel
revenues associated
with the ordinances
when pooled across
all localities (P =
.93). International
tourism was either
unaffected or
increased following
implementation of
the smoke-free
ordinances.
CONCLUSION:
Smoke-free
ordinances do not
appear to adversely
affect, and may
increase, tourist
business.
Samuels B, Glantz S.
The politics of
local tobacco
control. JAMA
1991;266:2110–7.
Department of
Medicine, University
of California, San
Francisco.
Until the
nonsmokers' rights
movement, tobacco
control activity was
at the federal or
state levels, which
is where the tobacco
industry dominates.
Since the appearance
of the nonsmokers'
rights movement,
progress in tobacco
control has occurred
primarily at the
local level. In
response to the
success of this
movement, the
tobacco industry has
developed "smokers'
rights" groups and
other tactics to
fight local
legislation. Several
recent local
campaigns in
California
illustrate these
tactics. Tobacco
control forces
follow many paths,
from sitting on the
sidelines to making
a serious commitment
to smoking control
legislation. Despite
the tobacco
industry's superior
financial resources,
the outcome of
proposed local
tobacco control
legislation appears
to depend on how
seriously the health
advocates mobilize
in support of the
local legislation.
When the health
community makes a
serious commitment
of time and
resources, it wins.
When it fails to
make such a
commitment, the
tobacco industry
prevails, more by
default than by its
superior financial
resources.
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